WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION OF
STATE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE^
by Marcia L. McCormick
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 70s there was an . . . anti-war slogan:
"What if they held a war and nobody came?"
The contemporary . . . counterpart to this would be
"What if we staged a revolution and nobody noticed?"1
It turns out that the Supreme Court has staged a federalism revolution, but
nobody has noticed. Well, actually, many have noticed that some kind of
revolution is happening, but few can make much sense of it and nearly everyone
has missed a piece that is revolutionary in its own right.2 Focusing on recent
cases restricting Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
^
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This statement appeared on the blog, “Simply Appalling: A Jaundiced Eye on the
News”on May 16, 2005 as part of a post on right-wing revolutions and nuclear weapons.
http://simplyappalling.blogspot.com/2005/05/second-american-revolution-goes.html (May 16,
2005). The original anti-war slogan is probably derived from a poem by Carl Sandberg, who
wrote, “[s]ometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come.” Carl Sandberg, The People, Yes
(1936). The sentiment has undergone a number of permutations in service of various goals, and
this permutation seemed appropriate to this topic.
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Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to

amendment, and the Supreme Court’s power under the Eleventh Amendment,
many commentators have argued that the Court is building up state power at the
expense of the national government.3 But at the same time that it has expanded
state power in these areas, the Supreme Court has expanded national power at the
expense of the states in others.4 One of these expansions has been in the amount
of deference the Court seems willing to grant state court interpretations of state
law. And the method of this expansion lies in the Court’s imposition of federal
separation of powers principles on state governments. In two cases in recent
years, the Supreme Court differentiated between the branches of government at
the state level to justify a refusal to defer to the state courts. It had never done so
before. By relying on a seemingly neutral federal principle, the Court hid the
aggrandizement of power to itself.
The first case we are all familiar with, and in fact are probably weary of:
Bush v. Gore, in which the Supreme Court ordered an end to a recount of ballots
cast in the 2000 presidential election.5 Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion
argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law should be
rejected; because the United States Supreme Court delegated the power to design
elections to the legislatures of the states, the Court had a duty to ensure that the
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 659 (2003).
3

E.g. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 234-41 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives]; Vicki C. Jackson,
Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 691, 699 (2000) [hereinafter, Jackson, Seductions]; see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570-71
(2003) (summarizing the main critiques).
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See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 659; Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100
MICH. L. REV. 80, 84 (2001); Merrill, supra note 3, at 569.
5

531 U.S. 98, 105-11 (2000).

state judicial branch was faithful to the will of the state legislative branch.6 He
explained that given this federal constitutional duty, the review and rejection of
the state court interpretation of state law “does not imply a disrespect for state
courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state
legislatures.”7 A flurry of scholarly contributions debated the propriety of not
deferring to the state court’s interpretation of state law, but none addressed the
court’s construction of state separation of powers in a systematic way.8
That flurry over the concurrence may have been much ado about nothing
except that three years later, to no fanfare, a unanimous court, deciding a
mundane equal protection challenge to a state tax, rejected an interpretation of
state law by a state supreme court, stating that “the Constitution grants legislators,
not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide whom they
wish to help with their . . . laws and how much help those laws ought to
provide.”9 In other words, rather than defer to the state court, the Supreme Court

6

Id. at 111-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

7

Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).

8

Louise Weinberg did discuss the issue in these terms, but devoted only a small portion of
her article to the issue, and instead, focused primarily on the fact that the Court decided the
outcome of the election, arguing that action was an unconstitutional aggrandizement of power.
Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 609, 625-27 (2002). Additionally, Professor Mark Tushnet wrote that Vicki Jackson
suggested this separation of powers issue in an e-mail to him in 2001. Renormalizing Bush v.
Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L. J. 113, 124 n.64 (2001).
9

Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003). At issue was a tax
on the proceeds of slot machines at the state’s racetracks and riverboats; these proceeds were the
primary source of revenue for both types of gaming establishment. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v.
Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002). At the state’s horse and dog racetracks, slot
machine proceeds were taxed at a maximum of thirty-six percent, while at the state’s riverboats,
they were taxed at a maximum of twenty percent. Iowa Code §99F.4A(6), 99F.11 (2003). Finding
that the proceeds were similarly situated, the Iowa Supreme Court then found the scheme

deferred to the state legislature. To date, this case, Fitzgerald v. Racing
Association of Central Iowa has not even been a blip on the radar screen of
federalism scholars.
Fitzgerald is representative of cases the federal courts routinely encounter
where they are asked to consider an issue of state law. That a state court had
already analyzed the law at issue does not make this case much more unusual. In
every one of those cases, the federal courts must decide whether to defer to the
state court analysis and, if so, how much. The federal courts will often defer, but
many times have not done so, and they rarely explain the reasons for the
departures they make. This article explores the reasoning behind the courts’
decisions about deference and endeavors to provide some guidance for when the
federal courts should defer to state court pronouncements of state law.
More specifically, part two of this article illustrates the lines of authority
on deference for different types of state statutory questions. Part three then
suggests the principles that underlie this distinction, and part four proposes
guidelines for the federal courts to use in analyzing these problems.
I submit that when the federal courts defer to a particular branch of state

irrational because the tax frustrated the purpose of the act creating it. Racing Ass’n of Central
Iowa, 648 N.W.2d at 561. The purpose found by Iowa Supreme Court was to promote the state’s
racing industry, in an effort to make an unprofitable venture profitable again. Id. at 560. Taxing
the proceeds at the race tracks at a rate so much higher than that of the riverboats damaged that
profitability, defeating the purpose of the act. Id. at 560-61, 562. Before the Iowa Supreme Court,
the state argued that the purpose of the act was to encourage economic growth and promote
agriculture. Id. at 560. The court found that even if this were the purpose of the act, this purpose
too was frustrated by the higher tax rate on racetracks. Id. at 561.
The race tracks argued that when the Iowa Supreme Court determined what the purpose
of the act was, the court was interpreting Iowa law, and that interpretation deserved the deference
that is almost always accorded state supreme court declarations of state law. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 26, Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (Apr. 29, 2003) (No.
02-695). In other words, that interpretation was binding on the United States Supreme Court.
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).

government at the expense of another branch, they risk infringing very seriously
on state sovereignty. The power of the federal courts to review acts of Congress
is a constitutional power. Similarly, the power of state courts to review acts of
state legislatures is a matter of state constitutional power. Where the federal
constitution explicitly grants state legislatures particular powers or where the state
court’s actions seem designed to evade judicial review or frustrate a federal right,
the federal courts are on relatively solid ground not deferring to the state courts.
Conversely, where the federal constitution treats the states as unitary entities and
where there is no indications the state courts are working to undermine an
important federal interest, the federal courts have little justification to exercise
independent review of state law. Not deferring runs the risk of dictating what
state constitutional law should be. And that result could nullify the power of the
people within the states to define their government and to define their individual
rights in a way more generous than that of the federal constitution.
II. FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO STATE LAW
The framers of our constitution are thought to have created our federal
system of government to diffuse power in order to guarantee the maximum
amount of individual freedom.10 The courts tend to treat our system of federalism
as dual, creating two judicial tracks, whose judges have competence over distinct
subjects.11 Federal courts are considered to have greater competence over federal

10

MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 4, 25 (1995); Robert
A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM & MARY L.
REV. 1399, 1401 (2005).
11

Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243,
246, 294 (2005) (describing and critiquing the theoretical model of dual federalism and its
perpetuation by courts).

law, and state courts, greater competence over state law.12 This notion of dual
sovereignty suggests a particular division of labor with regard to legal issues.
Federal claims and federal issues should be heard by federal courts, and state
claims and state issues should be heard by state courts.
But the world does not divide up quite so nicely, and there is significant
overlap of state and federal issues. So, for example, state courts are often called
upon to decide issues of federal law.13 State court competence over federal law is
not entirely surprising, because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and,
bound by the Supremacy Clause, not only are able to decide federal questions, but
have a duty to do so.14 Of course, that competence notwithstanding, scholars

12

MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION : TENSION IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 2-3 (2d ed. 1990); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:
Allocating Cases between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1236 (2004);
Schapiro, supra note 10, at 1409; see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1982); Philip P. Kurland, Toward a
Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 487
(1960).
13

In fact, given how few cases the United States Supreme Court hears, the states have
become important guardians of federal interests. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 1218-20; Robert
R. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme
Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1289,
1304 (2005); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 350-53 (2002).
14

See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977) (quoting Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974)); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1946) (holding that state
courts may not discriminate against federal claims but have a duty to hear them); cf. Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that this duty is simply not to discriminate, but that the states
are not required to hear federal claims if they do not entertain similar state claims); see also
Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995
WIS. L. REV. 39, 49-52, 161-70 (analyzing state court obligations not to discriminate against
federal claims).

disagree on whether state courts can adequately protect federal interests.15
As accepted as the notion of state court competence over federal issues is,
federal courts seem less competent to decide state law issues. The mantra of
modern federalism is that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
may only exercise the jurisdiction that the constitution or a federal statute grants.
Thus, our first instinct might to be to say that the federal courts should never
decide issues of state law.16
That approach, however, is not required by the text or structure of the
constitution.17 The constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to
“all Cases, in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties [and] . . . to Controversies” between certain parties.18
Moreover, the appellate power of the Supreme Court extends “both as to Law and

15

Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); see also e.g. Bator,
supra note 12; Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 599 (1991);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 233 (1988); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal
and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214
(1983).
16

See Schapiro, supra note 10, at 1426-28.

17

Many scholars have described the way that the federal and state governments actually
work together as “cooperative” federalism, which is not really a normative theory, but simply a
description of voluntary activity. E.g. Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM
65, 80-83 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty”
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998). John Kincaid has argued that cooperative federalism was
replaced by coercive federalism, where the federal government has used more coercive regulatory
tools, preempting state authority and presenting the states with unfunded mandates, in the late
1970s. John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 139 (1990).
18

U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.

to Fact.”19 By empowering the judicial branch to decide all cases and particular
controversies and by defining the appellate power as allowing de novo review, the
constitution gives the judicial branch the power to decide every issue, whether of
fact or law, whether state or federal, as long as that issue is contained in a case or
controversy that would fall within Article III’s limits.20 Thus, under the
constitution’s terms, the federal courts likely have the power to not only to
consider issues of state law, but to decide them without deferring to state court
constructions of that law.21
Not only does the text of the constitution allow the federal courts a broad
reach to decide state law issues, the structure of the constitution also demonstrates
that state and federal governance overlap significantly. The federal government
and the states share competence to legislate in many areas. While some categories

19

Id.

20

That is not to say that there are no constitutional limits on the review of facts found at
the trial-court level. The Seventh Amendment explicitly limits those facts a federal appellate court
can review, and the Due Process clause may also provide some limit. See Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 234 (1985). Additionally, the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine, which provides that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over
a case that presents a federal question if the judgment could be wholly supported on the outcome
of a state law issue, may have constitutional foundations. If the Supreme Court’s reversal of the
judgment would have no effect on the result, since the state court could issue the same judgment
on the state law grounds. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). The Supreme Court’s
decision would be an advisory opinion. Id.; see also Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 1053 (1999) (arguing that
the adequate and independent state law doctrine is a part of Article III’s standing requirement that
the injury be redressable). It is difficult to see, though, how what happened in Fitzgerald v. Racing
Association of Central Iowa, where the state did just that on remand, would not be an advisory
opinion in the same way. But see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 & n.4 (1983)
(detailing the circumstances in which the Court will take jurisdiction even though the judgment
could be sustained on state grounds where those grounds are not clearly the actual grounds relied
on, not truly adequate, or not truly independent).
21

Monaghan, supra note 20; Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-

are truly reserved to the states, like a general police power, and some are granted
exclusively to the federal government, like the power to grant patents, these
categories grow ever fewer as our society changes, and more conduct transcends
state boundaries.
Because of an overlap of federal and state law, the federal courts
encounter state law questions in a number of ways.22 The most obvious way is
when the federal court is sitting in diversity.23 Federal courts also encounter state

Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003).
22

See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 337-47, 358-59 ( ) (Story, J.) (considering
the federal courts’ power under Article III to review the judgments of state courts and to examine
issues of state law).
I use “federal courts” here to encompass the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
At this point, distinguishing between the two would only confuse the general introduction
provided in this section. However, the distinction has implications for analysis, but the end result
may be the same.
On review of state court decisions, the Supreme Court will encounter state law issues that
the state’s highest court has just interpreted in this particular factual context. Conversely, in the
lower federal courts and in the Supreme Court on review of those courts’ decisions, the state law
issues may or may not have been interpreted in a state forum, and will most likely not have been
applied to the precise context the court is considering.
It would seem that if the federal court at issue is reviewing a state court interpretation
formed in the case before it, then the federal court should exercise more deference to the state
court’s judgment. On the other hand, if the federal court is considering an interpretation of state
law issued in a separate factual context, there may be even less reason to suspect the state court of
interpreting the law so as to evade federal review, see infra note 162 and accompanying text,
which would also suggest that there is less reason not to defer.
23

The constitution grants the federal courts jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies . . . between
[c]itizens of different [s]tates.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress gave that jurisdiction to the
lower federal courts, as well. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Congress has provided that state law will provide the rules of decision in civil actions in
“cases where they apply” unless a treaty, federal law, or the constitution requires otherwise. 28
U.S.C. § 1652. The federal courts once fashioned general federal common law in diversity cases.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The Court interpreted the rules of decision act as
requiring the application only of state positive law, and not state common law. Id. at 12-13, 18-19.
One reason for the Court’s holding was its view that uniform federal common law would facilitate
commercial transactions, and the development of the law would serve as a model for states to
adopt. Id. at 19. Additionally, the Court viewed the creation of common law as the divination of

law claims when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that
arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as a claim the federal courts would
have jurisdiction over.24
In addition to these situations in which the state law issues make up
discrete causes of action, questions of federal law are often intertwined with
questions of state law, for example when the federal court is considering a federal
question to which federal common law applies and the content of that common
law is state law.25 Other examples of intertwined issues include situations when
the state law question is an essential step in the analysis of federal law, such as
when the court must decide whether the federal constitution protects a right
created by state law,26 or when a federal statute confers a benefit or puts a burden
on a class of people defined by state law.27 A third category of these state-law-

objectively correct legal principles, and so a part of the inherent power of judges. Id. at 2. Federal
judges would have the same power and expertise as state judges to discover these principles. Id.
The Court overruled Swift in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24

28 U.S.C. § 1367. When federal court jurisdiction is based on diversity, there is no
supplemental jurisdiction over parties that would destroy that diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
25

E.g. Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); United
States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979).
26

This describes, generally, procedural due process cases. The constitution prohibits the
government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (applying to federal government); Id. amend. XIV (applying to the states).
The first step in a procedural due process case is, generally, to decide whether there is a property
or liberty interest that the law protects, and usually, that interest is created by state law. E.g. Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
27

A well known example is the Internal Revenue Code which determines taxable income
on the basis of whether an individual is married, but does not define how a person becomes
married. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); cf. Id. § 7703 (providing rules that govern when in time a
person is considered married if that person has had a change in marital status and that certain
married people living apart will not be considered to be married). The federal Defense of Marriage
Act provides another limit on the definition of marriage, providing that for federal purposes,

antecedent situations occurs when the federal courts evaluate the constitutionality
of state laws.
The analysis that follows will refer to state law as if it were a single and
concrete concept. This is an oversimplification used to clarify a very murky area.
In fact, state law issues may come to the federal courts in a number of ways. State
law may be contained in a statute never interpreted by any state court, or it may
be contained in a statute that a state court has interpreted at some point.
Conversely, the law may have been made entirely through state common law.
Finally, it may come to the Supreme Court by direct review, and the lower courts
on certain limited kinds of collateral review, as a direct interpretation of the state
law at issue by a state court applying that law to the exact factual context the
federal courts face. The source and nature of the state law will make a difference
in how the federal courts should interpret and apply that law.
This article also discusses state law as if it were a single entity, and that
too is an oversimplification. For purposes of this discussion, the state law
determinations could range from pure questions of law, like what law applies, to
“mixed” questions of law and fact, or the application of the law to the facts.28

marriage is any legal marriage between one man and one woman, but it does not define for that
group what a legal marriage is. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
A similar issue is present when state law incorporates a federal law issue, such as when
state tort law provides that violation of a federal regulation constitutes negligence per se, or when
a state tax code defines taxable income as the income defined as taxable by the Internal Revenue
Code. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 n.14 (1986) (quoting
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934) and affirming in dictum that
the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over this federal question, but holding that
normally, the issue would not present a federal question before the lower federal courts as their
statutory “arising under” jurisdiction has been interpreted).
28

This article does not touch on the amount of deference to be given to lower court
findings of fact. For a discussion of that issue, see Monaghan, supra note 20 (Const’l fact review),
at 236-38. Although some courts and scholars assert that the different types of question are

Both categories may be reviewed de novo, but the more fact-intensive the
question, the more the courts may choose to grant some deference to the lower
courts.29
A. Rules Providing Deference to State Court Determinations
The propriety of whether federal courts should consider state law has been
addressed in several different situations, with fairly consistent results. In the
context of review of state court decisions, in 1875, the Supreme Court examined
whether to review issues of state law in cases from state high courts when those
state law issues were distinct from the federal law issues.30 The Court determined
that under the jurisdictional statutes, it could review all of the federal issues, but
that the holdings of the state court on issues of state law could not be reviewed.31
discrete, they are more properly viewed on a continuum. Id. at 233; Professors Allen and Pardo
argue that there is no defensible distinction between types of questions, and that questions of law
are simply different types of fact questions. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the
Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003).
29

Compare Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (applying de novo review to a
determination of reasonable suspicion) with Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 176 (1983) (deferring to application of law to the facts on whether a corporations
activities constituted a unitary business); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1999)
(plurality) (stating that fact-intensive issues of constitutional law require de novo review); id. at
148 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fact-intensive nature warranted deference);
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (using de novo review because law “acquire[s]
content only through application”); id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the factintensive nature of the question warranted deference). But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (holding that the in First Amendment cases, the
Court must exercise de novo review of the law and facts).
30

Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); see also Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether state
statutes are valid under state constitutional law).
31

Id. at 632-33. This principle is so firmly established that in Ring v. Arizona, the
Supreme Court deferred to an Arizona Supreme Court’s refusal to follow the United States
Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of an Arizona death penalty statute. 536 U.S. 584, 603
(2002). Some scholars have argued that Congress did intend to give the Supreme Court the power

This principle lies beneath the rule that the Supreme Court will not exercise
jurisdiction over a case in which a federal issue is present, even if that issue was
wrongly decided by the state court, if the judgment in the case rests on “adequate
and independent state grounds.”32
Similar to the rules developed for Supreme Court review of state court
decisions, federal courts encountering state issues must often defer to state court
declarations of law. For example, sitting in diversity, the federal courts, by statute,
must follow state constitutional, statutory, and common law.33 Thus, when the
state’s highest court has declared what the law is, the federal courts must follow
that when deciding diversity cases.
And similar to the adequate and independent state grounds threshold for
Supreme Court review of state court decisions, lower federal courts will abstain
entirely from considering cases in certain circumstances when state law is
unclear.34 For the court to abstain in constitutional cases, the state law must be
to review state court holdings on state court decisions because after the Civil War, Congress
fundamentally distrusted the state courts. Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural
Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1319 (1986).
32

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983).

33

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act
which is now codified with a few minor differences at, 28 U.S.C. § 1625). The holding in Erie
rested, in part, on perceived constitutional limitations. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of
Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 703 (1974); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974). Some scholars have cast doubt on these principles as constitutionally
required. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 315 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that “[t]he
constitutional basis for . . . Erie . . . has confounded scholars,” citing Ely and Stewart Jay, Origins
of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133, U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985); Martin H. Redish & Carter
G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 356 (1977)).
34

Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (concerning federal
question cases); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (concerning complex state

substantially uncertain and there must be a reasonable possibility that the state
court’s clarification will resolve the issue so that the court need not get to the
constitutional issue.35 In diversity cases, the state law issue must be unclear and
the case must involve some important state interest that is part of the state’s
unique power as sovereign, like eminent domain.36 Similarly, in federal question
cases in which the issue is regulated by a complex state administrative process
designed to treat uniformly an essentially local problem, the federal courts may
defer to the state process rather than issue injunctive relief.37
Special rules of construction have been developed that embody deference
to the states for cases in which the federal courts must interpret state laws that
have been challenged as violating the federal constitution.38 Statutes, even those
enacted by states, are presumed to be constitutional, and a challenger bears the

administrative procedures); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (expanding
Burford); Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (concerning
diversity cases).
35

Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973) (citations omitted); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 375 (1959) (citations omitted).
36

Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28; see Alleghany County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185
(1959) (holding that abstention is not always appropriate in eminent domain cases).
37

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (limiting this type of abstention
to equitable relief); New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI),
491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) (limiting abstention to situations that would substantially interfere with
administration of an essentially local program).
38

These ideologically neutral rules of construction have been called “quasi-constitutional
law,” and can be used by the Court in a very sophisticated way to promote a number of values,
including ideological ones, through its decisionmaking. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 593 (1992).

burden of demonstrating that a statute violates the constitution.39 Where the
challenge is that the law is unconstitutionally vague, it must be vague in all of its
applications, not merely unclear in some instances.40 Where a statute might seem
on its face to violate the constitution, if the state court has given the statute a
narrower construction that would be constitutional, that construction will be
upheld.41
B. Rules Providing Less Deference to State Courts
The federal courts will not always defer to state court determinations,
however. Even in the diversity context, the federal courts have some flexibility to
interpret state law. If the state’s highest court has not spoken on the issue, the
federal courts are not required to certify a question to those courts. And they do
not have to defer to the state’s appellate courts unless the federal courts are
convinced that the state supreme court would agree. In other words, the federal
courts are allowed to predict how the state supreme court would decide the
issue.42
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Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers , Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 198 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
40

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 n.50 (1972) (citing Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)).
41

Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, ___, 125 S. Ct. 847, 851-52 (2005) (quoting Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002)). In a way that is less deferential to the states than abstention, in cases that involve
constitutional issues and pendent state law claims, a federal court can decide the issue on the state
law claim if doing so avoids the constitutional issue, and need not refer it to the state for decision.
Siler v. Louisiana & N. R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). That approach affords the state significant
deference by not calling a state law into constitutional question, and avoids some of the problems
posed by abstention, such as delay and increased cost.
42

CHARLES WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL COURTS 396 (6th ed. 2002).
Additionally, the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the findings of lower federal courts

Additionally, there are many situations in the state-law-antecedent cases
where the federal courts will interpret what state law means even if the federal
court also gives some amount deference to a state court interpretation. State law is
antecedent to a federal issue when the “existence, application or implementation
of a federal right turns on the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state
law.”43 When the federal right depends in this way on an issue of state law, the
federal courts have the ability and the duty to decide what impact the state law
will have on the federal law.44 That impact, is actually a federal question, and not
really interpretation of the state law at all, even though the federal court analysis
may look as if the federal court is interpreting the state law.45 Moreover, even in
a state-law-antecedent case in which the state court construction of the issue
would resolve the matter and preclude consideration of the federal question, the
federal court may need to review the state law to some extent to ensure at the least
that the law is not being construed to impair federal interests.46 As a practical
matter as well, the Supreme Court will often interpret state law, rather than
on the law of a state within their jurisdictions. Phillipps v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524
U.S. 156, 167 (1998). Deference is not warranted if state expertise would not be warranted in
interpreting the state law. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2804 (2005).
43

Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the
Law and Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977).
44

Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State
Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1925-26, 1935-47 (2003).
45

Id. (analyzing the issue primarily in the context of constitutional cases and referring to
this as “characterization” of the issue for federal law purposes).
46

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 498 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter
HART AND WECHSLER]; Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of
State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should defer to state court judgments unless it explains why it has reason to suspect the states of

remand the matter to the state’s highest court for its interpretation when it must
determine whether a right under a state statute was unconstitutionally denied,47 or
when the state statute itself is unconstitutional.48
When a state court has spoken on the issue, the Supreme Court usually
looks to see whether the decision of the state court “rests upon a fair or substantial
basis . . . [I]f there is no evasion of the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal
ground of decision has fair support, [the Supreme] Court will not . . . substitute its
own view of what should be deemed the better rule.”49 This fair support rule
applies generally to state-law-antecedent issues.
But the Supreme Court does not always follow the fair support rule. In
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,50 for example, the issue before the Court was
whether a teacher had a vested contract right that could not be impaired under the
constitution’s Contract Clause.51 The Indiana Supreme Court had ruled that she
had no contract under Indiana law, but the Supreme Court stated:
On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord
respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the state’s
highest court but, in order that the constitutional mandate may not
become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for ourselves whether
a contract was made, what are its terms and conditions, and
whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired its obligation.
This involves an appraisal of the statutes of the State and the
frustrating the operation of federal law).
47

Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).

48

Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942).

49

Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930).

50

303 U.S. 95 (1938).

51

Id. at 96-99. The constitution’s Contracts Clause is in art. I, §10.

decisions of its courts.52
The Supreme Court found, contrary to the Indiana Supreme Court, that the
Indiana statutes and the state’s actions under those statutes created a contract
between the teacher and the state, which was protected under the constitution’s
Contracts Clause.53
Even though the Supreme Court found no evasion of the constitutional
issue, the Supreme Court did not evaluate whether the state court’s interpretation
of state law had fair support. Thus, federal supremacy may sometimes provide a
basis for the federal courts to deviate from the normal rules of deference.
C. Unifying the Two Approaches
This review of deference rules reveals that the amount of deference that
the federal courts afford the states ranges from total abstention, to de novo review
of state law. The rules that have emerged are pragmatic and balance state
autonomy against federal interests.54 Essentially, the traditional rule has embodied
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Brand, 303 U.S. at 100.

53

Id. at 105, 108-09. It is possible that rather than deciding the issue as a matter of state
law, the Court was deciding the federal effect of the state laws. See General Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (“The question whether a contract was made is a federal
question for purposes of Contract Clause analysis . . . and ‘whether it turns on issues of general or
purely local law we cannot surrender the duty to exercise our own judgment.’”). Professors
Monaghan and Fallon argue that the Due Process clause has some core conception of liberty and
property, defined as matters of federal law, that state law must satisfy, but state law rarely fails to
satisfy those thresholds. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327-29 (1993); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Of Liberty and Property, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 440 (1977); see also Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995) (holding that state law mandating certain procedures be
followed before a prison inmate could be disciplined did not by itself create a liberty interest but
that only a sentence that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life” would impair the limited liberty interest an inmate could have).
54

The rules could actually promote an ideological purpose of the Court, rather than a

a dualist federal approach: the federal courts primarily review issues of federal
law, and state high court determinations are mostly final on issues of state law.55
While that is a general rule, the federal courts are less likely to defer or
affirmatively ask the state to interpret a state law when faced with a state-lawantecedent situation.
This description of the federal court approach to state law issues
demonstrates that in practice, the decisions of the federal court can appear ad hoc
and result oriented. And when judicial federalism cases are compared to other
cases considering legislative federalism, the federal courts’ approach seems even
more confusing. The Supreme Court seems sometimes to be promoting state’s
rights and sometimes to be expanding the national power without consistency.
Most recently, the Rehnquist Court seemed to breathe new life into state
power by limiting Congress’ power under the commerce clause and Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, while strengthening the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments. In United States v. Lopez56 in 1995 and United States v. Morrison57
in 2000, the Court struck down legislation as beyond Congress’ commerce clause
power, for the first time since 1937.58 In City of Boerne v. Flores,59 the Court

neutral federalism purpose. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism:
An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741
(2000) (documenting how the Justices use federalism strategically to promote ideological goals).
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Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2004). Since
Morrison, the Court seems to have stepped back from this states rights jurisprudence. In Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), the Court upheld the federal Controlled
Substances Act as valid commerce clause legislation that preempted California’s Compassionate

limited Congress’ power to create legislative rights broader than the constitutional
rights the Fourteenth Amendment created.60 That decision was applied to broaden
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment, limiting Congress’ ability to subject the
states to suits for money damages.61 Using the Tenth Amendment, as well, the
Court during this time period limited federal power in New York v. United States62

Use Act. The Compassionate Use Act had allowed individuals to grow small amounts of
marijuana for their own use when a doctor recommends the drug for serious medical conditions.
Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §11362.5 (West Supp. 2005). In its most recent decision, the
Court avoided the federalism issue in a case involving the executive branch’s attempts to preempt
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, which allowed doctors to prescribe drugs to help terminally ill
patients commit suicide, by finding that Congress failed to give the executive branch the power to
prohibit doctors from prescribing these drugs. Gonzales v. Oregon, 04-623 (Jan. 17, 2006).
59

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

60

Id. at 519-20, 536.
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Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
The Eleventh Amendment was strengthened in this way by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), in which the Court held that Congress could only abrogate state sovereign immunity under
its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Not only are states immune from suit in federal court, but
Congress cannot subject them to suit in their own courts either. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999). For a thorough analysis if this Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Marcia L.
McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed, 37. IND. L. REV. 345 (2004).
Like in the commerce clause context, the Court seems to be stepping back here as well.
Four cases in the last three years have upheld Congress’ power. In Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the Court held that Congress had the power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Family Medical Leave Act. In Tennessee v. Lane, 540 U.S.
___, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004), the Court upheld Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act as a
valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity at least as far as it mandated access to courthouses
and other functions of government. Then in two bankruptcy cases, Tennessee Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, ___ U.S.
___, 2006 WL 151985 (Jan. 23, 2006), the Court held that Congress could subject the state to suit
in in rem bankruptcy proceedings under its bankruptcy powers in article I.
62

505 U.S. 144 (1992) (finding that Congress could not “commandeer” state governments
to accept ownership of radioactive waste or implement federal legislation on the subject).

and Printz v. United States.63 The Court has also taken a restrictive view of
federal power in habeas corpus jurisdiction64 and civil rights cases.65
Currently, in all but the Tenth Amendment context, the Court has issued
subsequent decisions that elevate federal interests above states rights.66 And at the
same time that it issued the strong states rights decisions described above, the
Court has issued decisions that extend the national power in other areas.67
Taken as a whole, then, the Court’s federalism decisions seem inconsistent
and ideologically based.68 The following section of this article seeks to divine
some non-ideological guiding principles that federal courts can draw on to explain
the level of deference they are giving to the states in state law issues.
III. FEDERAL CONSIDERATION OF STATE-LEVEL INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
As the federal courts encounter state court determinations or state common
law, there is a spectrum of options available to the federal courts. At one end of
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521 U.S. 898 (1997) (prohibiting Congress’ mandate that local law enforcement
conduct background checks on applicants for gun permits as commandeering).
64

E.g. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (expressing concern that habeas filings
threatened the finality of state court judgments, implicating comity and federalism).
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E.g. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 421 (1996); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S.
25, 32 (1993). But see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1069 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion as ignoring federalism interests).
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Supra notes 58, 61.
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E.g. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564
(1997) (striking down a state tax incentive on dormant commerce clause grounds; Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (finding state law preempted).
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Cross & Tiller, supra note 54, at 757-62, 768; David Niven & Kenneth W. Miller,
Federalism by Convenience: The Supreme Court’s Judicial Federalists on the Death Penalty and
States Rights Controversies, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 567 (2005); see also Jackson, Narratives, supra
note 3, at 280.

the spectrum, the federal courts would abstain from deciding issues of state law at
all, and would simply defer entirely to any state determination of what the law
means or how it should be applied to these facts. At the other end of the spectrum,
the federal courts would review every issue of law or fact de novo, with no
deference to any prior holdings by the state courts either in the case before the
federal court or in one that would be precedential in state court.
While all of the cases fall along this continuum, the federal courts rarely
explain what reasoning underlies their decisions to defer or not. A great number
of the variances from the usual rule of deference can be explained, however, by
notions of institutional competency: the federal courts are deferring to the state
institution that is most competent to perform the task at issue or not deferring
where the particular state institution lacks special competency.
Federal court discourse has long incorporated the concept of institutional
competence, usually under the principle of separation of powers. That notion, has
nearly always been articulated when it has been employed in a fashion, horizontal
to the federal judicial branch, with the federal courts determining whether the
federal judicial branch, Congress, or the President is more properly suited for a
particular task. Occasionally, though, state-level institutional competence has
been the explicit focus of the federal courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
concurrence in Bush v. Gore69 is the most famous, or infamous, example.
This part analyzes the cases in which the Supreme Court has not deferred
to state court interpretations of state law with a particular focus on those cases in
which the Court has explicitly deferred to the state legislative branch. I submit
that because the federal constitution rarely differentiates between the branches of
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531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

state government, the federal courts have little justification for doing so.
Ultimately, deciding which branch of state government should have primacy over
any particular issue is a matter of state constitutional law. In other words, just as
federal judicial review is part of the federal courts’ constitutional power, the
interpretation of state law is simply an exercise of the state courts state
constitutional power. As such, the balance of that power should be left to the
states to work out.
A. Independent Review in State Courts’ Interpretations
of the Meaning or Content of State Law
The Supreme Court has admitted that it is engaging in independent review
of the meaning of state law and rejected the state court’s interpretation of that law
in few cases, and each of those instances was in service to the supremacy of an
important and substantive federal right or enumerated power. In Fairfax’s Devisee
v. Hunter’s Lessee,70 for example, the Supreme Court had reviewed the state law
of Virginia independently to determine the proper title to land because the state
law issues were antecedent to deciding what rights the putative owner had under
federal treaty.71 State hostility to the role of the Supreme Court and the supremacy
of federal law at the time of the Fairfax case may have made such rejection
necessary.72 Born out of similar resistance to federal authority, the Supreme
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11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 603 (1813).

71

Id. at 618-28. The Court explained its reasoning to do this in Fairfax in Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 357-58 (1816).
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Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing GERALD GUNTHER &
K. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61-62 (13th ed. 1997)). This hostility was based at least in
part on state hostility to British creditors after the Revolutionary War. Wythe Holt, “To Establish
Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 1421, 1438-49.

Court’s decisions in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson73 and Bouie v. City of
Columbia74 rejected state supreme court deviations from prior state law when
those deviations themselves violated due process.75 And at a more stable time in
history, in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,76 the Supreme Court similarly
rejected the Indiana Supreme Court’s construction of state law where that
construction could be argued to have deprived a teacher of property without due
process of law.77
Conversely, in most instances in which a state court is interpreting what a
state statute means, the federal courts will defer to that state court interpretation.78
But this is not always the case. The most controversial example is Bush v. Gore,
in which a majority of the Supreme Court ordered an end to a recount of ballots
cast in the 2000 presidential election.79 The majority held that no constitutionally
permissible recount could be accomplished by a deadline that gave the states a
“safe harbor,” even though the Florida Supreme Court was given no opportunity
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357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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378 U.S. 347 (1964).
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Bouie, 378 U.S. at 350; Patterson, 357 U.S. at 455.
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303 U.S. 95 (1938). This case is discussed in greater detail in part II, B, supra.
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Id. at 108-10.
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See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997) (holding that the federal courts lack
the authority to construe a state statute differently than the state’s highest court has);R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding that state supreme court’s interpretation was binding);
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (putting the issue in
jurisdictional terms); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 (1993) (contrasting
interpretation of a state statute from conclusions about what effect the statute has).
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531 U.S. 98, 105-11 (2000).

to determine whether the legislature intended to take advantage of this deadline in
a situation like this.80 Rather than remand to the Florida Supreme Court to order
that the recount proceed in a method consistent with Florida’s election law, the
Supreme Court held that any constitutional method could not complete the
recount in time to comply with what it interpreted the election law to require.81
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence went further. In it he argued that
the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted Florida election law when it ordered the
recount and, thus, impermissibly thwarted the will of the Florida Legislature.82 As
a precursor to this conclusion, the Chief Justice argued that the United States
Supreme Court had a duty under Article II of the United States Constitution,
which assigned the power to direct the appointment of electors to the legislatures
of the states, to ensure that the state judicial branch was faithful to the will of the
state legislative branch.83 He explained that given this federal constitutional duty,
the review and rejection of the state court interpretation of state law “does not
imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally
prescribed role of state legislatures.”84
Thus, where the state courts are suspected of undermining the supremacy
of the federal government as an institution, depriving an individual of a federal
constitutional right, or otherwise violating an express provision of the
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Id. at 110-11.
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Id. at 111.
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Id. at 116-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Id. at 111-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).

constitution, the federal courts will not defer to those courts.85
B. Independent Review in the Statutory Purpose Context
Another less analyzed area is state court declarations of the purpose of
legislation. The purpose of legislation is an important consideration in First and
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional analysis, as well as dormant commerce
clause analysis. In these contexts, the courts apply varying levels of scrutiny
based on the type of legislation at issue and the interest at stake, and these levels
of scrutiny embody varying levels of deference to the states. Some types of
restrictions and classifications are simply not allowed. For example, in the
Establishment Clause context, the government may not impose a requirement or
restriction on individuals for a religious purpose.86 Other restrictions and
classifications are given strict scrutiny: the law must be the least restrictive means
to achieve a compelling state interest.87 Still others receive intermediate scrutiny:
the law must be substantially related to an important state interest.88 The vast
majority of legislation receives rational basis review: the law must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.89
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Laura S. Fitzgerald has argued that these should be the only times that the federal courts
should fail to defer to state court interpretations of state law. Fitzgerald, supra note 46.
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
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Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
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United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
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Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993). Justice O’Connor suggested that
there should be an even lower threshold for invalidating state legislation under the commerce
clause than the standard used under the due process clause because a federal court decision on
commerce clause grounds may be overcome more easily by the legislature. ASARCO, Inc. v.
Idaho St. Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 350 n.14 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice

For strict and intermediate scrutiny, the state bears the burden to
demonstrate that the purpose of the legislation is to promote the right kind of
governmental interest.90 For rational basis review, on the other hand, the burden is
on the challenger to demonstrate either no legitimate governmental interest, or no
rational relationship between the interest and the means chosen by the
legislature.91 The legislature need not articulate that purpose, and if they do not,
the courts will evaluate whether any plausible legitimate purpose could be behind
the legislation.92 This test is not completely boundless, however. The legislature
must have been able to consider the legislative facts before it to be true.93 Still,
those facts need not actually be true; that legislative facts turn out to be mistaken
is not a reason to reject a purpose based on those facts.94
The Supreme Court has stated that it affords deference to state court
declarations of purpose similar to that, if not quite at the same level, of
interpretations of meaning.95 For example, in United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
O’Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 419 (1985).
90

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33 (stating that in intermediate scrutiny cases, the state bears
the burden to show an important governmental objective and that the means are substantiallly
related to that objective); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (holding that in the strict
scrutiny context, the state may not simply assert that the interest to be served is compelling and the
means narrowly tailored, but must provide strong evidence of it).
91

Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (quoting Madden
v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).
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Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992).

93

Id. at 11.
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Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (holding that the belief is

enough).
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This qualification was noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 383-84 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting), although it is not made explicit in the cases

Thornton,96 the Court stated, “[w]e must, of course, accept the state court’s view
of the purpose of its own law.”97 Similarly, in Allen v. Illinois,98 both the majority
and the dissent agreed that the state court was the authority on both the meaning
and purpose of state law.99 In fact, the rules that the Supreme Court has developed
will sometimes lead to greater deference to findings of purpose. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that the purpose of a state law is a question of fact,100 and
that the parties may present evidence on the subject.101
that he cites.
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514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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Id. at 829.
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478 U.S. 364 (1986).
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Id. at 367 (accepting the state court’s interpretation of purpose, but also analyzing the
statute); Id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the state is the final authority on both
meaning and purpose, but disagreeing with the effect of the statute).
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Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 544 (1982) (treating the issue
as one of fact). Although the law at issue in Crawford was a proposition amending California’s
constitution, the Supreme Court did not indicate that the type of state law made a difference in the
analysis, and it does not seem that a statute’s purpose should be treated more like a question of
law. Certainly state court interpretations of the meaning of state constitutional provisions should
be given enormous deference because those constitutions embody a particularly sovereign interest,
the state courts are uniquely situated to interpret that meaning, and the federal courts are not
competent to second-guess the state courts except in extremely rare circumstances. However, the
issue is not one of meaning, but rather one of purpose, which is more like a historical fact than is
the slippery notion of group intent.
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United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938). It is not enough to
provide evidence that the legislature was mistaken, however.
[S]o long as “it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the
legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is
at least debatable.” Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably
supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the
legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was
mistaken.
Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.

Despite these assertions, the Supreme Court has rejected state court
findings of purpose in several cases. In the Establishment Clause context, the
Court has stated, “[w]hile the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation
of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere
and not a sham.”102 Because Establishment Clause cases warrant a very searching
review, this result seems analogous to those cases involving meaning where the
Court suspected the state courts of evading Supreme Court review.
In the context of rational basis review as well, though, the Supreme Court
has rejected state court findings of purpose. In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Commission of Webster County,103 the statute and constitution of the state
provided that property tax valuation be based on a particular criterion.104 The
Supreme Court rejected a state court finding that the legislature could have
intended to base valuation on a different and incompatible criterion.105
While in these examples the Supreme Court is rejecting an expansive
at 154.). That is not the type of proof at issue in Fitzgerald or Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997), discussed infra. Those cases concerned evidence of what the legislature considered and
intended, not of the validity of the facts before the legislature.
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Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S.38, 64 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 75, (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24
(1963)).
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488 U.S. 336 (1989).
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Id. at 345.
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Id.; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14-15, 16-17 and n.7 (1992)
(distinguishing the situation before it from Allegheny Pittsburgh). In another situation in which the
Supreme Court defended its decision to construe purpose broadly, the Court distinguished a prior
case that had not. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (distinguishing
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572 (1949) and stating, “[h]aving themselves
specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose
for their existence”).

interpretation of purpose, found in an attempt to make state legislation legitimate,
in at least two recent cases, the Court has rejected limiting interpretations of
purpose state courts used to strike down legislation, as well. In Kansas v.
Hendricks,106 a Kansas man challenged the state’s Sexually Violent Predator
Act,107 arguing among other things that it was a punitive statute which violated
the federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto
laws.108 The Supreme Court treated as a matter of law, and thus a question of
statutory construction, the law’s classification as civil or criminal.109 The court
then looked at the placement of the statute in the Kansas codes and analyzed the
statute’s language and structure.110 The Court found that two things manifested
the intent of the legislature that the statute not be punitive: 1) the placement of the
statute in the probate code; and 2) the statement within the statute that its purpose
was to create a civil commitment procedure.111
The Kansas Supreme Court had held, despite these two things, that the
“overriding” purpose of the statute was punitive – to segregate people subject to it
from the public – and that any treatment was “incidental at best.”112 The court
held this, in part because the legislature had stated in its declaration of purpose
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Kan. Stat. Ann. §§59-29a01 through 29a21 (2005).
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Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-61.
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Id. at 361 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
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Id. at 361-67.
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Id. at 362.
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In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996).

that sexually violent predators could not be treated under the existing civil
commitment statute, which provided for commitment of people with mental
illnesses, and no effort had been made to treat any offenders.113 Accordingly, the
Kansas Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the statute was to
incarcerate, not to provide treatment.114
The United States Supreme Court rejected this formulation, finding that
the statute could have more than one purpose, and the mere possibility that the
Kansas legislature could have intended that sexually violent predators be treated
in an ideal world was enough to make this a civil statute.115
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the statute contained enough
punitive aspects that its purpose was ambiguous.116 Given that ambiguity, Justice
Breyer argued that the finding by the Kansas Supreme Court that the purpose of
the statute was to incapacitate and not to treat offenders should be entitled to
deference.117
Six years later, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion in Fitzgerald v.
Racing Association of Central Iowa for a unanimous court, refusing to defer to the
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Id. The state supreme court found it particularly troubling that the statute did not even
allow for treatment until after a sexually violent predator had served the original criminal
sentence. Id.
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Id.
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Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367-69.
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Id. at 379-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer supported the finding of the
Kansas Supreme Court by analyzing the statute and the record, which detailed the lack of effort
made to treat Hendricks. Id. at 385-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Iowa Supreme Court’s finding of purpose.118 At issue in Fitzgerald was a tax on
the proceeds of slot machines at the state’s racetracks and riverboats; these
proceeds were the primary source of revenue for both types of gaming
establishment.119 At the state’s horse and dog racetracks, slot machine proceeds
were taxed at a maximum of thirty-six percent, while at the state’s riverboats, they
were taxed at a maximum of twenty percent.120 Finding that the proceeds were
similarly situated, the Iowa Supreme Court then found the scheme irrational
because the tax frustrated the purpose of the act creating it.121 The purpose found
by Iowa Supreme Court was to promote the state’s racing industry, in an effort to
make an unprofitable venture profitable again.122 Taxing the proceeds at the race
tracks at a rate so much higher than that of the riverboats damaged that
profitability, defeating the purpose of the act.123
The race tracks argued that when the state court determined what the
purpose of the act was, the court was interpreting Iowa law, and that interpretation
deserved the usual deference.124 In other words, that interpretation was binding on
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Id. at 560.
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Id. at 560-61, 562. Before the Iowa Supreme Court, the state argued that the purpose of
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that even if this were the purpose of the act, this purpose too was frustrated by the higher tax rate
on racetracks. Id. at 561.
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539
U.S. 103 (Apr. 29, 2003) (No. 02-695).

the United States Supreme Court.125 The state court had found that the purpose of
the statute at issue was to promote the racing industry in Iowa, and that the
differential tax rate was not rationally related to that purpose.126
But the Supreme Court did not agree that it owed any deference to the
state court. Rather than accept the purpose the state court found, the actual127
purpose, the Supreme Court theorized multiple potential legitimate state interests
that the differential tax could rationally relate to, found that rational relationship,
and upheld the tax under the federal constitution.128 To justify its decision not to
defer to the state court, the Supreme Court stated,“the Constitution grants
legislators, not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide
whom they wish to help with their tax laws and how much help those laws ought
to provide.”129 In other words, rather than defer to the state court, the Supreme
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Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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This was the stated purpose of the legislation. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v.
Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 560-61(2002). At trial, the state contended that another purpose of
the legislation was economic development. Id. at 560. The court found that the differential level of
taxation could only serve to drive the racetracks out of business. Id. at 561.
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I use this term here to highlight the approach of the Iowa Supreme Court, and not
necessarily as an endorsement of the correctness of that court’s holding.
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Not to be outdone, the Iowa Supreme Court later struck down the tax under the Iowa
Constitution’s Equal Protection provision, although it did so not by creating a separate test under
its constitution, but through an “independent application” of the federal test. Racing Ass’n of
Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Iowa 2004) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 500 (1977)), There
is no (federal) question that the Iowa court could do that and reach the same result the United
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Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1501,
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Court deferred to the state legislature.
While this may seem analogous to Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in
Bush v. Gore, which relied on the constitutional delegation of authority to the
state legislative branch, one important ingredient is missing. The constitution
does not expressly delegate the authority to set state policy to the state legislative
branch. That power would be reserved to the state as a whole, as evidenced by
the Tenth Amendment, which makes no distinction between the branches of state
government.130
Certainly, there may be other arguments that support the decision to defer
to a particular branch of state government in the purpose context that are different
from those in the meaning context. For example, less deference may be
warranted in the purpose context than that given in the meaning context because
saying what a statute means is different from saying why a statute exists, and that
difference suggests different institutional competencies. The language and
meaning of the statute determine how that statute will operate on the world.
Conversely, the purpose of legislation has very little effect on the world. It can be
used to help interpret the meaning, or, given an improper purpose, it can make the
statute invalid. However, the purpose by itself usually changes nothing in the
world.
Additionally, the legislature is in a position better than the courts to say
why a statute is needed. Thus, when the legislative act is presumptively valid, in
other words when rational basis would apply under a constitutional analysis, the
federal courts must defer to legislative possibilities rather than the holdings of
courts. Conversely, where the judicial branch has greater competence, which it
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does when it interprets what the law means as written because by doing that it
gives effect to legislative intent and culls a single meaning from multiple actors,
the state judicial branch warrants deference.
Yet, an equally persuasive argument could be made to treat purpose
interpretations with more rather than less deference. The federal courts have
expertise equal to that of state courts to interpret statutory language. Statutory
interpretation is something that all courts do. Conversely, the state courts are in a
much better position, as part of the state government, to understand why particular
legislation was passed. The state judges are more likely to know what public
debate over the issues was when the legislation was created than are their federal
counterparts. State judges are also more likely to have some insight into the state
legislative process. Thus, the state courts are in a substantially better position to
interpret the purpose of state legislation than are the federal courts.131
C. Separation of Powers at the State Level
The lesson to be taken from all of these cases and modes of deference is
that where the constitution affords leeway to the states, the court is likely to defer
to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judiciary. This was
implied by the majority in Hendricks, and it was stated explicitly by the Court in
Fitzgerald. Conversely, where the constitution limits state power more, the court
is more likely to defer to the interpretation of state law by state courts unless there
is a reason to suspect the courts themselves of interpreting the state law in order to
mask a constitutional violation or to deprive a party of due process or equal
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On yet another side, the fact of the Fourteenth Amendment may suggest that states
cannot be trusted to tell the truth about what the purpose of some legislation is if that legislation
impacts individual rights. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 57, 66-74 (1993).

protection.132
But, there is nothing in the federal constitution that warrants giving
deference to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judicial branch
in the majority of situations. The federal constitution does not distinguish between
state legislative and judicial branches in describing the powers of each.133 And,
the only constitutional provision that limits the form the state government may
take and the distribution of powers within state government is the Guarantee
Clause, which provides
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against
domestic Violence.134
Not only is the constitution silent about how states organize themselves within the
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This was Justice Rehnquist’s stated reason for deferring to the legislative branch in his
concurrence in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1842, 1900-01 (2001).
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It is true as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in Bush v. Gore that
Article II, Section 1 delegates the power to determine how to elect presidential electors to the
legislature of each state. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article I, Section 4, which details how members
of Congress shall be elected also refers to state legislatures and contrasts that power with
Congress’ power, rather that the power of the state judicial branch. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. In other
places as well the constitution refers to different branches of state government, assuming a
structure somewhat similar to that of the federal government. Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of
Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54-58 (1998).
No section suggests anything about the primacy of one branch over another. Moreover, there is no
historical support for the significance of the language in Article II. Hayward H. Smith, History of
the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 731 (2001).
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

bounds of a republican form of government,135 the Supreme Court has held that
interpretation of this clause is a political question and not justiciable.136
State constitutions, then, define how state governments are to be formed
and how various governmental powers exercised, and because the institutions of
government are not identical to their federal counterparts, the competence of those
institutions is not identical to that of their federal counterparts, and their powers
need not be separated in exactly the same way.137 In fact, state constitutions often
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This silence has not uniformly been interpreted to mean that the constitution fails to
limit the exercise of power within state government. Dorf, supra note 133, at 58 (arguing that the
structure of the federal constitution implies that states should be organized in federal-style
separation of powers terms); Louis H. Pollak, Judicial Power and “The Politics of the People”, 72
YALE L. J. 81, 88 (1962) (stating that the federal constitution suggests that a republican form of
government meant a tripartite arrangement like that of the federal government).
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Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). That the issue is a political question
does not leave the states entirely unregulated. The federal government must guarantee that a
state’s form of government is republican, and with the federal courts out of the picture, it is up to
Congress to interpret what that means. Congress has not spoken on the subject.
Congress’ power is probably not unbounded. The Court’s opinion in Baker v. Carr may
have signaled that in the right case, the Court might interpret issues touching on this clause. 369
U.S. 186, 208-32 (1962). See also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that the
guarantee clause is a judicially enforceable limit on federal power). The Supreme Court has
suggested, based on Merritt’s argument, that the clause might limit Congress’ power to regulate
state activities and would, in those cases, be justiciable. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
137

In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that this issue is a matter of state constitutional

law.
Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a state shall be kept
altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons
belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers
which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government, is for the
determination of the State.
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902); see also Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th
Cir. 1991) (holding that the states need not have the same separation of powers limitations as the
federal government); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (1998);
Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1884-86; James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism:

give the judicial branch a much broader role in government than that possessed by
the federal judicial branch.138 For example, state courts are not bound by Article
III’s justiciability doctrines and, in fact, often share a policymaking role with the
legislative branch.139 Conversely, in some instances, state courts have a narrower
role in government than does the federal judicial branch.140 Thus, separation of
powers operates quite differently at the state level, and among the states, from
how it operates at the federal level,141 but it remains an issue of state
constitutional law.
Federal separation of powers doctrine limits the power of the federal
courts to strike down federal legislation on the ground that unelected judges
should not be given the chance to frustrate the will of the majority except in a few
instances.142 In every case involving legislation, there is a chance that the court

Power and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1744-46
(2003). The federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether state actions violate the state’s
constitution. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798).
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could frustrate the will of the majority. It is easy to see that when a court strikes
down legislation as unconstitutional, the court is countering the will of the
majority, but that is only the tip of the countermajoritarian iceberg. Every time a
court is asked to interpret legislation it risks frustrating the will of the majority
because the court might come to a meaning different from what the majority of
legislators thought they had intended.143 Similarly, even where the court has
interpreted the statute “correctly,” the court might apply the statute to reach a
conclusion different from that a majority of legislators would have reached. Thus,
every interaction between the federal courts and a legislative enactment brings
with it an inherent risk of contermajoritarian action.144 Because of this risk, many
Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 707-08 (1995). As the
Supreme Court has said,
federal courts may exercise power only “in the last resort, and as a necessity,”
and only when adjudication is “consistent with a system of separated powers and
[the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the
judicial process.”
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (alteration in original) (putting the separation of powers
principle in the context of justiciability and quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman,
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
143

Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen where Congress has amended statutes in
response to interpretations it did not agree with. E.g. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166
§2(2), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) was not an accurate interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
144

Part of this difficulty lies in the nature of statutory interpretation. How is it possible to
assign a single meaning to a complex collection of words put together by a number of different
actors, subject to differing influences, through an interactive process designed to frustrate the
exercise of power? The elusive nature of statutory interpretation and how courts should engage in
it has been debated by many. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252-54 (1992) (describing the views of
Judges Posner and Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit, and Justice Scalia, the three most
prominent voices in the current statutory interpretation debate). For more on the debate between
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United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.) with id. at
1331-38 (Posner, J., dissenting); see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 275

scholars contend that the federal courts should intervene only where intervention
is necessary to protect the political minority from a tyranny of the majority.145
The countermajoritarian concern is not as warranted for many states, and
thus the state court powers need not be quite so limited. Many states elect their
judges, who may then, because they are more accountable to the electorate than
appointed judges, pose less of a danger of frustrating the majority to the extent
that they create a tyranny of the minority.146 Even unelected state judges may pose
less of a countermajoritarian difficulty for state law issues, arguably, than do

(1990) (discussing whether an objective method of statutory interpretation is possible); ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-29 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (rejecting the notion that legislative bodies can have “intents”). For
an alternate view of statutory interpretation, see e.g. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38-47 (1994) (describing and criticizing overreliance on the text to
the exclusion of other interpretive tools).
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government by the majority); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (arguing that the judicial power could be
dangerous in this way, but that the institutional limits the Court puts on itself guard against the
worst dangers); Redish, supra note 142, at 707-08 (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty).
But see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 500 (1989) (suggesting that courts might have a
role in defining public policy).
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Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1887 (citing HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND
FRANCE 21 (7th ed. 1998); Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999));
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1158-60 (1999). Of course, those judges may be ill-equipped to
prevent tyrannies by the majority, but that is an entirely separate issue being debated in states
across the country. Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1887 (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 288 (1996); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726-28 (1995)); Hershkoff,
supra, at 1160-61.

federal judges for state or federal law issues. State judges may feel closer to their
communities than do federal judges simply by virtue of the fact that state districts
are smaller.147 Additionally, as a part of state government, state judges may feel
more bound to that smaller community of people and be more active in other
ways in it.148 As a result, they may be more likely to know what the will of the
representative branches is and what remedies are expected within the state.
This closeness is especially salient for statutory interpretation; state judges
are more likely than their federal counterparts are to know what the issues of
public debate were when state legislation was proposed, what the state legislature
thought it was doing when it passed legislation, and what the situation in the state
was before and after that legislation was passed. That may be less true at the trial
level where the districts are within a state’s boundaries, but would apply with
some force at the appellate level. Certainly, there is little to suggest that the
United States Supreme Court is in a better position than any state court to
understand why the state legislature thought that particular legislation was
needed.
State courts also have more flexibility to respond to local concerns than do
federal courts because the state court decisions are not as far-reaching, and as a
result, may be viewed as more democratically legitimate.149 Thus, the state
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Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1887, 1902 (quoting Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural
Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 732 (1981)); Burt Neuborne,
Foreward: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 899
(1989). This flexibility, however, might limit state judges’ use of politically unpopular remedies

judicial branch need not be restrained in the same way that the federal judicial
branch has restrained itself.
Apart from the concerns about the accountability of institutions, federal
separation of powers theory seeks to take advantage of a different kind of
institutional competence: a faith in a functional division of labor.150 The federal
elected branches are better equipped than are the federal courts to create national
policy, and were designed that way to develop expertise in that type of policy
making..151 Conversely, the federal courts are more competent to adjudicate
disputes among parties and to say what legislation means or how it applies to the
world.152 Coupled with this separation of functions is the notion that the federal
government is one of limited jurisdiction, so that the judicial power of the federal
when those remedies are called for. Id. at 1887-88 n.287 (citing CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS
UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 148-50 (1996); Dan T. Carter, “Let Justice
Be Done”: Public Passion and Judicial Courage in Modern Alabama, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 553
(1998)).
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courts is thought to be rather narrow.153
The function of state courts, on the other hand, are not limited in this way.
First, they are courts of general jurisdiction, and therefore are viewed as having
broader inherent powers than those of the federal courts.154 For example, the state
courts have always engaged in common law lawmaking, while the federal courts
are though to be able to create common law only in limited circumstances.155
Additionally, many state constitutions give the state judicial branch a broad
responsibility to help make state policy or exercise administrative power, either
explicitly or through provisions that grant positive rights to individuals.156
Additionally, state legislative and executive branches are not necessarily
organized the same way with the same power as their federal counterparts, which
lessens their special expertise or democratic responsiveness.157 And finally, many
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states have mechanisms for direct, rather than representative democracy,158 which
some commentators suggest necessitates greater state court vigilance to protect
against tyrannies of the majority made possible by a less deliberative form of law
making.159 Based on the different institutional competency of the state courts and
the state representative branches, there is little reason to assume that state
separation of powers must play out the same way as in the federal system.160
Because the issue of state separation of powers is fundamentally a matter
of state constitutional law, then, the federal courts should leave that balance to the
states as a unitary entity. Where the state court has interpreted a state statute, its
very exercise of interpretation struck a particular balance. Even if the state court
exceeded its powers under the state constitution, the issue is one that should be
left to the states to sort out. The federal courts, even if they have to power to do
so, should not intervene. Therefore, the federal courts should defer to the balance
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struck by the state courts and accept the interpretation offered by the state court in
an exercise of that balance unless there is an important federal interest that would
conflict with that deference.161
IV. TO DEFER OR NOT
Given the starting point that the primacy of a branch of government is a
matter of state constitutional law to be struck by the states, the inquiry necessarily
must turn to an exploration of what interest might be sufficient to warrant not
deferring to the state judicial branch once it has struck a balance and interpreted
state law. That reason would seem to have to be a relatively strong one that
promotes sovereignty of some substantive federal interest.
The most compelling reason to not defer would be in a circumstance in
which the federal court has a reason to suspect that the state court is working to
frustrate a federal right or a federal interest.162 For example, where the state court
deviated from prior state law in a way that violated due process, as the Supreme
Court found had happened in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson163 and Bouie v.
City of Columbia,164 the federal court would have a constitutional duty to
intervene. In this way, state courts might interpret state law in a way to frustrate
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review by federal courts and frustrate enforcement of important federal rights.165
Conversely, the most compelling reason to defer would be where the state law
issue was truly discrete from any federal issue, such that no federal interest could
be said to be at stake.
Short of these situations, deciding whether to defer is much more difficult.
The vast majority of state action is reviewed under a standard that is designed to
be quite deferential: rational basis review.166 In fact, rational basis review is so
deferential that some commentators have suggested that it is not review, but is
instead the absence of review, the refusal to commit judicial resources to subjects
outside of core constitutional concerns.167 Rational basis review does not enforce
any substantive right or enumerated power.168 Rather it is a way to limit the
countermajoritarian power of Article III judges.169 Thus, rational basis review
embodies a policy of deference to the federal legislative branch, and it embodies a
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policy of deference to the states. But the rational basis test does not enforce any
positive Constitutional delegation of power to the state legislative branch that
would justify not treating the states as unitary entities.
And so, on the one hand, it is easy to see why, in exercising rational basis
review, the federal courts reflexively defer to the legislative branch, any
legislative branch, at the expense of any gloss a court has put on the law, as a
function of accepted notions of federal institutional competence. But as explained
above, assessing institutional competence at the state level is not for the federal
courts to address in most instances.170 The question of institutional competence is
a matter of state constitutional law in the first instance, a question more properly
dealt with by state courts under the Supreme Court’s notions of dual
federalism.171 Thus, without some substantive federal interest to enforce, the
federal courts have no good reason not to defer to state court interpretations of
state law.
One could argue that the federal interest at stake is in uniformity, that the
rational basis test must mean the same things everywhere that it is applied.172
Uniformity is an important federal interest, but only when it serves to protect
federal sovereignty. If the federal government has no sovereignty interest, then it
has no interest in uniformity. To say otherwise would take us to the world
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envisioned by the Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson,173 where the development of
common law by the federal courts spread uniform common law throughout the
country for the sake of uniformity alone. Going there is certainly a choice we
could make as a society, but we have not made it, and in fact the Supreme Court
specifically rejected it in Erie.174 Without a substantive federal interest enforced
by the rational basis test, it is difficult to see why the federal courts should
exercise independent judgment on an issue of state law any time a state court has
spoken.
At the opposite end of the review spectrum, where a fundamental right is
at stake, or a suspect class affected, the federal constitutional test to apply would
be strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, unlike rational basis review, is employed to
enforce substantive federal constitutional values, those of equality and liberty.
The Fourteenth Amendment represents a fundamental shift of power to protect
individual rights away from the states and to the federal government.175 Individual
rights to liberty and equality are at stake even where strict scrutiny is not
employed, as well, and the Fourteenth Amendment places vindication of those
rights is primarily in the federal government.176 So perhaps the proper touchstone
here is simply whether a liberty or equality issue is at stake. If so, the federal
courts have an interest that warrants exercising independent review, not deferring
to at least some state court interpretations.
Certainly, there are reasons to defer even here, however. For example,
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allowing states to interpret their laws narrowly so as to avoid federal
constitutional questions strengthens the quality of state government by allowing
the state judicial branch to participate in enforcing the federal constitution. It also
limits extending constitutional principles without a solid foundation. And so, the
federal courts, it would seem, have stronger reasons both to defer and not to defer,
depending on the state law issue, in the strict scrutiny context.
In either context, where the state court is overprotecting a federal interest
or underprotecting a state interest, it is difficult to see what federalism value is
promoted by failing to defer to the state court interpretation of state law.177 One
argument for not deferring could be that if states wish to deviate from the federal
model, they should do so by grounding decisions in their own constitutions, rather
than by relying on federal constitutional principles. In other words, let the states
be politically accountable for their decisions rather than suggesting that the
federal government is responsible.
By not allowing state courts to shift responsibility, the federal courts may
enhance political responsibility in a more positive way, as well. States and
localities are given the chance to use the state political process to remedy
constitutional violations, which may give those remedies greater credibility with
the people of the state, which in turn should make those remedies more
effective.178 Not only does the chance for democratic resolution enhance the
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effectiveness of the remedy, but so does the fact that the remedy is chosen by
insiders rather than seen as imposed from outside.179 Experimentation by state
legislatures may lead to a greater ability for the states to innovate on ways to
remedy constitutional problems.180 That innovation benefits us all.181 This state
innovation, however, might be achieved by ensuring a strong role for the state
judiciary, regardless of whether the constitutional limit the state courts rely on is
federal or state.
This inquiry has implications far beyond the meaning or purpose the state
courts find, as well. The state courts’ processes necessarily impact the deference
equation. For example, for a brief period of time the Connecticut Supreme Court
adopted a method of statutory interpretation that is different from the method used
in the federal courts.182 That court held that it could use any contextual
information to interpret the text of a statute even if that text was not ambiguous,
contrary to what is called the “plain meaning rule,” which is used by the federal
courts, and which allows a court to consult extratextual materials only when
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statutory language is ambiguous.183 The method of statutory interpretation should
be a matter negotiated between the states legislative and judicial branches, and not
necessarily imposed from outside unless that method is somehow used to frustrate
a substantive federal interest. Similarly, state choices about the amount of
deference reviewing state courts give to lower state tribunals may differ from their
federal counterparts. It is difficult to see how that decision implicates any
substantive federal interest to warrant imposing the federal model on the states.
Ultimately, a lack of deference could impact the states’ abilities to interpret the
substantive provisions of their own constitutions where those constitutions mirror
the language of the federal constitution, or perhaps even where similar rights are
only mentioned. Even for those who argue against a dual federalism model, this
result would encroach too far into state autonomy and sovereignty.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal courts encounter state law issues in a great variety of ways
with varying levels of state court interpretation attached. To date, the federal
courts have treated the state courts sometimes as if they were lower federal courts
and sometimes as if they were the courts of completely separate sovereigns
without explaining why. While this lack of transparency gives the federal courts
the greatest amount of discretion and power, it does little to support the legitimacy
of the federal courts. This article has attempted to describe when the Supreme
Court will defer and when not, and found that difference somewhat counterintuitive and in conflict with the Supreme Court’s notions of dual sovereignty.
While dual sovereignty might be neither truly possible nor desirable in the age of
the administrative state, it can provide some practical boundaries to divide the
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labor of the courts in our federal system when they necessarily interact. Thus, this
article has suggested that the federal courts defer to state courts unless an issue
presents a substantive federal interest that warrants independent federal review. I
hope that this provides some normative guidance that the courts could consider in
negotiating those interactions.

